INTRODUCTION
Much uncertainty looms on the horizon as America attempts to tailor its armed forces to future threats. The uncertain nature of these coming threats places a premium on innovation among the services. U.S. Marine Commandant, General Charles C.
Krulak, stated in a recent issue of Navy Times that America's next war is likely to bear little resemblance to Desert Storm but rather involve combat in an urban environment against non-state actors. 1 An analysis of the employment of the Israeli Defense Additionally, the PLO had increased its world diplomatic status, as evidenced by Arafat's speech to the United Nations(UN) in 1974. 6 The increase in the military capability of the PLO brought harassing artillery barrages and terrorist attacks on the Israeli population in line with "armed struggle" strategy. In March 1978, Israel conducted Operation Litani to establish a 20 kilometer buffer zone north of Israel's border with Lebanon to rid the Israeli population of the PLO threat. 7 The IDF advanced as far north as the Litani River, clearing a 20 kilometer buffer zone that would be enforced via a UN security force and a pro-Israeli Lebanese ground unit commanded by Major Saad Haddad.
As time wore on, the PLO returned to the UN buffer zone and established armed camps that served to reestablish a base of operations from which to continue their "armed and surprise the PLO with its intensity and synchronicity.
The Israelis planned three courses of action to confront their latest threat from the PLO. 15 The first plan was similar to Operation Litani, in that it aimed to establish a buffer zone between Israel's northern border and the PLO military capability in Lebanon. as to which of the first two limited plans were approved by Prime Minister Begin, but history shows that it was the Big Plan that was actually executed on the battlefield, due largely to the manipulations of Defense Minister Sharon. 16 As American forces have re-learned the importance of clearly defined objectives in accomplishment of the mission, the Israelis would learn this lesson during their first operation that did not have the preservation of the legitimate territory of Israel at its heart.
At the operation's outset, Prime Minister Begin stated its objective as the establishment of a 40 kilometer buffer zone in Lebanon to ensure that Israeli territory was beyond the range of all PLO artillery and rocket fire. 17 It was to be a seventy-two hour operation.
The end state envisioned a buffer zone that would be enforced by the UN, resulting in the neutralization of the threat of artillery attack on northern Israeli inhabitants. The objective, end state and duration of the stated operation were in keeping with Israeli doctrine of choosing the time and place to go on the offensive in order to swiftly achieve Because of Israel's lack of strategic depth, trading space for time was not a consideration. The territory of Israel was considered too valuable and giving up any of it was not an option. Therefore, in keeping with IDF doctrine, time is a critical element of success and was the key ingredient of the operation. The IDF had to strike quickly and Israel found itself in a dilemma. Their Lebanese allies, the Christian Phalange force under the leadership of Pierre Gemayel, refused to conduct an urban assault on Beirut to destroy the PLO elements in the city. 32 This left Israel with a choice between conducting their own urban assault on the city or adopting an attrition-style siege of the city to negotiate a PLO and Syrian withdrawal. Facing an increasingly hostile world and domestic reaction to their protracted war in Lebanon, they chose the siege option and started the squeeze of Beirut by shutting off food, water and electricity in the city and conducting sporadic air, artillery and naval bombardments to help the negotiations along.
During the cease-fire, IDF units advanced in small doses to realize piecemeal territorial gains on the outskirts of Beirut while casualties and Israeli domestic dissatisfaction with 10 the operation grew. 33 In an effort to further help the negotiations for a PLO withdrawal, Sharon ordered a massive air, artillery and naval bombardment of PLO headquarters in Beirut on 12 August, which incited a swarm of unfavorable world opinion. This was followed by a cease-fire called by the Israeli cabinet, which had had enough of Sharon's deceptive and manipulative execution of the operation and decided to strip the Defense
Minister of his decision-making power. 34 The cease-fire held and the PLO withdrawal from Beirut under the direction of a multi-national force of French legionnaires, Italian paratroopers and U.S. Marines began on 21 August. Operation Peace for Galilee was effectively over, yet the questions surrounding this planned three day operation that grew into three months and required a three year occupation of Lebanon had just begun.
OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
Marine General Richard Neal guards against the "Tyranny of the Four T's" in devising a recipe for the successful conduct of future military conflicts. 3 Twc Israeli capabilities that were unaffected by the terrain were the amphibious assault capability of its Navy as well as the versatility and lethality inherent in the IAF.
The Israelis executed a truly joint operation that combined air, land and maritime capabilities to overwhelm and confuse the enemy and enable a mass of armored ground forces to successfully drive north. The IDF has always emphasized the human factor in equipping the man to exploit technology, rather than just manning high-tech equipment.
As the technological playing field is sure to be leveled in future conflicts, it serves as a potent reminder of the importance of understanding the limitations of a high-tech force.
While tactical proficiency is a must in ensuring military success, the application of set-piece tactics to all situations can lead to failure. Israel was unprepared for the urban combat that it faced in fighting the PLO. An analysis similar to what General Krulak calls a "cultural Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield(EPB) to reveal the structure and support mechanisms of an opponent that seems rag-tag and disorganized on the surface", would have uncovered the PLO's strength in blending in with the local populace. 37 The final phase of the PLO's "armed struggle" strategy calls for Palestinian civilians to rise up and join arms in a popular war. While this did not occur during the operation, the PLO used the Palestinian refugee population to shield its fighters from the BDF. Knowing Israel's concern for the safety of non-combatants, the PLO fighters melted into the refugee camps and urban areas and in some cases used their own people as hostages to complicate the IDF's mission of sanitizing Lebanon of the PLO threat.
This severely slowed down the IDF's tempo, as care was taken to only conduct urban clearing operations during daylight hours in order to limit collateral damage and harm to 
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• civilians. Additionally, the PLO exploited the media by alleging the indiscriminate killing of civilians and damage to civilian structures by the IDF. While some of this was a natural consequence of urban warfare, a large amount was due to the placement of PLO units and equipment in areas concentrated with civilians, as well as using hospitals and other non-military structures for their own military purposes. 38 The lessons of Operation Peace for Galilee have particular relevance today. As the trend towards shifting of the population base into cities and along the littorals continues, the emphasis of the US Marine Corps is shifting towards military operations on urbanized terrain(MOUT). As the global trend continues towards non-state actors with armed forces of "fighters" rather than soldiers, one of the key advantages of these "fighters" will be their proximity to civilians in their urban base of operations. 39 The IDF learned in the siege of Beirut and clearing operations in refugee camps and coastal cities that a constrained use of firepower is paramount to mission success, as the media is sure to focus on the effects of collateral damage. This measured use of firepower in future conflicts wHi involve the use of non-lethal as well as precision weapons. As the Israelis learned that a large armored force has serious limitations in urban terrain and the protraction of a limited operation can seriously degrade the domestic support required of a democracy, so can the U.S. armed services learn from this operation. As General Krulak submits: "our tool kit for the future must hold more than sledgehammers". 40 
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